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ROLE OF THE IAF IN THE TSUNAMI RELIEF OP SEA WAVE;
OP RAINBOW; OP CASTOR
On 26 December, the last Sunday of the year, a small news ticker on one of the news channel
read “Mild earthquake rocks Chennai. No damage reported”. This turned out to be the understatement of the century, as the
unfolding events later demonstrated.
An undersea earthquake occurred at 00:58:53
UTC (07:58:53
local time) on December
26, 2004. The earthquake originated in the Indian
Ocean just north of Simeulue island, off the western
coast of northern Sumatra,
Indonesia.
The earthquake generated a tsunami that was among the deadliest disasters
in modern history, which devastated the shores of Indonesia, Sri Lanka,
Thailand, South India and up to Tanzania, with waves as high as 18 m
(55.8 feet). The majority of deaths recorded were in Indonasia,
Sri Lanka,
Thailand,
India
and Maldives.
The magnitude of the earthquake increased from the initial report of 6.8 to 8.5, 8.9, and
9.0. New studies estimate the strength at 9.3; It was the largest earthquake since the 9.2 magnitude Good Friday Earthquake
off Alaska in 1964.
The epicentre of the main earthquake was some 160 km (100 miles) west of Sumatra, at a
depth of 30 km (18.6 miles) below mean sea level (initially reported as 10 km). This is at the extreme western end of the
Ring of Fire, an earthquake belt that accounts for 81 percent of the world's largest earthquakes. The earthquake itself
(apart from the resulting tsunami) was felt as far away as
Bangladesh,
India,
Malaysia,
Myanmar,
Thailand,
Singapore and the
Maldives.
An estimated 1200 km (750 miles) of faultline slipped about 15 m (50 ft) along the
subduction zone where the India Plate dives under the Burma Plate. The rupture proceeded north-westerly at a speed of about 2
km/s (1.2 miles/s), beginning off the coast of Aceh before it turned northwards towards
the Andaman and Nicobar Islands The India Plate meets the Burma Plate at the Sunda
Trench, where it subducts the Burma Plate, which carries the Nicobar Islands, the
Andaman Islands and northern Sumatra. Beside the
sideways movement between the plates, the sea bed is estimated to have risen by several metres, triggering the tsunami waves.
The waves did not originate from a point source, as mistakenly depicted in some illustrations, but radiated outwards along
the entire 1200 km (750 miles) length of the rupture. This greatly increased the geographical area over which the waves were
observed, reaching as far as Mexico and
Chile.
In the aftermath of the resultant death and wide scale destruction, in addition to
providing succor to its own, India was quick to
extend help to Sri Lanka, The Maldives and
Indonesia. Mobilising with impressive speed the
first relief package to Sri Lanka was underway
within 12 hours of the disaster. The operations were fully underway in the neighbourhood by day 3.
The tsunamis affected 2260 Kms of the Indian coastline besides the entire
Nicobar Islands. The tidal waves on the mainland were between 3 to 10 meters high and
penetrated between 300 m to 3 kilometers.
One of the peacetime roles of the Indian
Air Force is to assist the civil administration in dealing with natural calamities. Over the years the IAF has had fair
experience in tackling such situations, what with the air effort put in during the Latur earthquake in central and the
Gujarat earthquake in western
India a few years back.
THE FIR
After the mild tremors felt along
the east coast of India, the first inkling that
all was not well was the message received at the Air Force base at Chennai. The Do-228 based at Carnic, switched on its HF at
0730h and transmitted a May Day message to the Oceanic Control Centre, Chennai. The message read as follows:
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“MAYDAY, MAYDAY, MAYDAY, Chennai, Chennai Chennai this is Victor Juliet Golf on ground
at Carnicobar. Carnicobar hit by a severe earthquake and flooding of the island by tidal waves.
Island is sinking, request immediate rescue and relief”.
Immediate Response
The Armed Forces
launched operation “SEA WAVE” for relief, rescue and evacuation. This was co-ordinated by the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS).
On receipt of the first information about the disaster, at 0815 h on 26 Dec 04, Air Headquarter swung into action and set its
machinery in motion. A Disaster Relief Cell was set up at Air Headquarter Operations Room, on a round the clock basis.
Two AN-32 aircraft were immediately put on alert in Headquarter Southern Air Command.
Other Commands Headquarters were also instructed to keep their aircraft in readiness for the expected Rescue Relief and
Casualty Evacuation Operations. The first AN-32 aircraft was launched at 1000h and the second at 1036h for Carnic with
refueling halts at Tambaram and Port Blair. Both aircraft landed in Carnic by 1636h. Meanwhile, a Do-228 was also launched
from Port Blair, with AFCC on board, for a first hand assessment of the situation.
RELIEF
OPERATIONS
Command &
Control
The overall responsibility for coordinating relief work was given
to Headquarter Integrated Defense Staff with representatives from Ministry of Defence, Service Headquarters, Coast Guard,
MEA, MHA, MOCA and Ministry of Shipping etc. Meetings were held twice daily to rationalise various relief requirements, to
allocate resources for undertaking relief work and to determine future requirements.
Andaman & Nicobar
Islands
An Integrated Relief Command was also set up under the LG Andman
& Nicobar Islands with CINCAN as the Vice Chairman.
Airlift Resources. As the
magnitude of the disaster became clear, resources in addition to the already tasked AN 32 , the AVRO and Do 228 fleets had to
be garnered. With the normal air logistic operations underway, only two IL-76 aircraft were available for relief work. Two
IL-78 aircraft were also de-modified and pressed into the relief operations. Four Do 228, Four AVROs, Seven IL-76s, 15 AN 32s
and 16 Helicopters were pressed into action for this Operatioins.
Mainland
Relief
Air Effort for Coastal States. As an extensive and effective land transport
communication system exists on the mainland, the Air Force involvement for the relief was rather limited. Since the damage
was restricted to immediate coastal areas with rest of the support infrastructure intact the air effort requirement was
relatively less and surface transport was used for relief operations. However, air effort was used for reccee of affected
areas, Cas- Evac, rescue operations and a few sorties for landing bulk supplies. A total of 67 sorties and 96 hours, were
flown towards this task.
Island
Relief
Speed was of essence in order to save precious lives and to mitigate further
effects of the disaster. A massive airlift operation was therefore put in place from the mainland. The aircraft involved were
heavy lift IL-78/IL-76, medium lift An-32, AVROs and Do-228. The Heptrs used were MI-17, MI-8 and
Chetak/Cheetah.
The
Air
Bridge. An
Air Bridge
was soon established for the A&N islands, Sri
Lanka and The Maldives; the main hub-centres were
Delhi, Chennai, Tambaram and Carnicobar/Portblair. While airlift
operations were undertaken from all over the country. Bulk/major supplies were lifted from
Delhi/
Bombay/
Calcutta/ Bhubneshwar/ Ahmedabad and flown directly to Carnicobar
by the IL-76/78 aircraft. At the Indian Air Force base at Car Nicobar, owing to water ingress and sustained IL-76 Operations,
the runway was declared unfit for IL-76 Operations on 04 Jan 05. Thereafter, IL-76 aircraft normally landed only at Port
Blair, except when operationally essential/unavoidable.
Operation 'SEA WAVE' : Airlift
Operations for Andaman & Nicobar Islands
The first two An-32 aircraft landed at
Tambaram and from there proceeded to Port Blair/Carnic after readjusting the load to 3.2 T. Refuelling was not available at
Carnic due to suspected contamination. However, fuel was subsequently declared fit at Carnic. Average round trip from
Hyderabad -Tambaram-Carnic-Port Blair-Tambaram-Hyderabad was 11
hours.
From Port Blair and Carnic, the southern islands such as
Campbell
Bay, Nan Cowry and Katchall etc were supplied by Heptrs/AN-32/Do-228
aircraft. The Landing strip at Campbell
Bay remained available for
Operatioins.
Additional Helicopters. In
order to meet the additional requirement of airlift resources for Southern Island Operations, five additional heptr were
flown in from the mainland to Carnic following the land route of via. Chittagong-Yangon-Diglipur-Port Blair-Carnic. The ac
were in place and operational by 02 Jan 05.
Operation 'RAINBOW': Airlift
Operations for Sri
Lanka
At the request of Sri Lankan
Govt six medium lift helicopters were sent to Sri
Lanka to undertake relief Operations. Three helicopters positioned on 27 Dec 04 and
three on 28 Dec 04. The helicopters undertook Cas Evac, distribution of relief supplies, deployment of medical teams and air
dropping of food while operating from Katunayke and Minneriya bases.
Total air effort
involved including ferry of aircraft, was 445 missions, 316:10 hours and tonnage and pax lifted were 328.845 tonnes and 882
respectively. The helicopters returned on 22 Jan 05.
Operation 'CASTOR'
: Airlift Operations for
Maldives
Two Para drop modified, long range AVROs were tasked to proceed to
Maldives on 28 Dec 04 at the request of
Maldives Government for assistance. These aircraft undertook inter-island operations within
Maldives carrying out landings on various short
field runways. Their task was to undertake Cas Evac, air landing of food, water and other supplies and deployment of medical
teams.
Total air effort involved was 155 sorties 198.00
hours and tonnage and passengers lifted were 169.425 tons and 885 respectively. The ac returned to
India on 31 Jan 05.
Salient Features of Air
Operations.
(a) Flying Time. Average flying time for an IL-76 round trip was about 10
hours. For the An-32 it was even longer.
(b) Loading /off loading time. The ‘On Ground
Time’ on an average was 6 hours for loading and 3.4 hrs for off-loading.
(c) Refuelling
Constraints. No fuel was initially available at Carnic due suspected contamination. An-32s had to refuel at Port Blair
and other aircraft at Chennai.
(d) Crew Fatigue and Flight Safety. After the Bhuj
experience, these aspects were kept sharply in focus.
(e) Status of Navigation Aids/Runway
Lighting. There is an urgent need to upgrade the status of Navigationl Aids/Runway Lighting.
(f) Type of Relief Equipment. The relief equipment ranged from basic feed, water, shelter
medical hospitals to generators, boring equipment, common equipment and building material etc.
FLOOD RELIEF EX- KURNOOL
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 Rescue by a Helicopter
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Unprecedented rains in North Karnataka from 29th Sep
2009 onwards flooded several districts and cut off areas like Bijapur,
Bagalkot and Bellary, some places receiving over 50 cms of rains in
a single day. The floods inundated the Krishna and Tungabhadra rivers.
Karnataka released 25 lakhs cusec of water from Almatti and Narayanpur
dams in a single day, a record of sorts. With Andhra Pradesh itself
in a grip of severe rains in the last week of September, all reservoirs
were brimming to their capacities. On First October, reports were received
that water levels were rising dangerously in the town of Mantralayam.
The water levels rose so much that it submerged most of the villages
inhabited as far as one km from the normal river bank. That condition
of these villages was critical is an understatement.
The water levels were so high that a village which was
about one km away from the river bank was also totally under water.
The nearest bank was too far away now and the water levels were as high
as roof tops. With water levels still rising and most lives hanging
around on these roof tops, villagers were not sure whether they were
going to survive the next hour or not.
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 Emergency Air Dropping
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To their rescue came the helicopters of the Indian Air Force.
Four helicopters of IAF under the command of Gp Capt Rajesh Isser were
tasked to provide relief and rescue operations to the people of flood
affected parts of Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. On Second of October,
the task was challenging as operating conditions were critical with
villagers in a dire state of survival. Marginal weather made the task
even more challenging. The flood relief and rescue missions were carried
out with a zeal and passion rarely seen, yet in a most professional
manner by the air warriors of the IAF.
To add to the tough conditions, the fuel bowser was unable to
reach Kurnool due to the breaks in the road bridges over Krishna and
Tungabhadra. On one side the fuel bowser was stuck 20 nm short of Kurnool
town and on the other the fuel requirement was mandatory to continue
any type of rescue/relief operations. Analysing the gravity of situation,
the Task Force Commander got airborne and on assessment of the situation
realised that there was no clear dry ground available to allow the bowser
to approach without getting bogged down owing to rains. Keeping in mind
the Flight Safety aspects, a landing spot on the national highway was
selected and a decision to operate from the NH-7 taken. The rescue and
relief missions continued.
A total of eight rescue missions saved 47 lives that would have surely
perished. Each mission was a daunting and challenging experience in
itself. The missions varied from picking up people from roof tops to
those surviving on trees. In one case, a total of nine lives were stuck
on a roof top. The increase in water flow washed away half of the house
along with four persons, leaving behind the remnants with remaining
five persons hanging on between life and death. To their fortune, and
within no time, a Chetak helicopter came as a saviour. All of them were
winched up in the nick of time as per the District Collector’s
report.
In another case, a family of four consisting of husband, wife and two
small children aged between four and six each were stuck on a tree in
the centre of the fast flowing river. It was not an easy task to rescue
these people from the centre of tree with all its branches spread around.
No orders or procedure exists that specified the manner in which such
a mission could be undertaken. The crew of the Chetak helicopter used
their ingenuinity and experience and rescued the entire family in a
most professional yet flexible approach. After their rescue, the crew
noticed that their condition was very critical and their skins were
totally parched and coming out in flakes. They had been stuck in that
tree for over 72 hours without food, water and sleep. Every such mission
makes helicopter pilots the world over feel proud of their machines.
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Landing of a Helicopter on the Highway
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Many relief missions were carried out during the seven-day ordeal.
A total of 1,20,000 kgs of relief material including water, food and
medicines were dropped to the victims who were in dire need. People
were stuck on roof tops and the small Chetak helicopter was able to
carry out drops accurately roof-to-roof. It was a difficult task as
the area to drop food/water was very small and in the centre of a furious
and fast flowing river. The IAF carried out these operations in a most
accurate and efficient manner. These relief material were not only a
must for their physiological needs but more importantly to generate
in the victims ‘a will to survive’ and a ray of hope to
live another day.
All missions were efficiently carried out by seven helicopters of the
IAF. Each mission, whether it was a flood relief operation by the pilots
or a rescue mission, was a daunting task taken on with professionalism.
The entire mission can be rightly summed up in the words of District
Collector of Kurnool in the press conference on 07 Oct 09 where he stated
“…. The people of Kurnool will always be indebted forever
to the efforts of helicopters of the IAF. Not only did the IAF save
47 lives, but helped 6000-7000 people everyday to believe that survival
and help was just around the corner”.
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